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Meyers: Criminal Procedure: Face-to-Face Confrontation in Childe Sex Abus

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION IN
CHILD SEX ABUSE PROSECUTIONS*
Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)
An Iowa trial court convicted defendant of engaging in lascivious
acts with two young girls., Pursuant to an Iowa statute designed to2
protect child victims from the trauma of facing the offender in court,

a screen separated the defendant from the two girls during their4
testimonyA The screen allowed the defendant to observe the girls,
but prevented the girls from seeing the defendant. 5 The Iowa Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting defendant's contention that
the use of the screen violated the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision7 and HELD, use
of the screen violated the defendant's confrontation rights because it
denied him a face-to-face encounter with the witnesses s
In response to the increasing incidence of child sexual abuse, 9 many
states have passed laws to facilitate the prosecution of these cases. 10
*Iwould like to dedicate this comment to my parents, Joann and Irvin Meyers, for their
constant encouragement and support.
1. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988).
2. IowA CODE § 910A.14 (1987). The statute provides, in part: 'The Court may require a
party be [sic] confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or mirror that permits the party
to see and hear the child during testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the
party." Id.
3. 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
4. Id. The Court noted that the combination of the screen and lighting adjustments enabled
the defendant "dimly to perceive the witnesses .

. . ."

Id.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 2800 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 397 N.W. 2d 730 (1986)). The Iowa Supreme Court
also rejected defendant's due process argument that the screen made him appear guilty, thereby
denying him a presumption of innocence. Id. The instant Court considered it unnecessary to
reach this issue because the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses had been
violated. Id. at 2803.
7. Id. The Court remanded the case to the Iowa Supreme Court to determine whether the
violation was harmless error. Id.
8. Id. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority. Id. at 2799. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring
opinion with which Justice White joined. Id. at 2803. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion
with which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 2805.
9. See D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1-3 (1984) (survey results); O'Brien, Television Trials and FundamentalFairness: The Constitutionality of Louisianas Child Shield
Law, 61 TUL. L. REV. 141 n.2 (1986).
10. Bulldey, Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse: Law Reforms in the Mid1980's, 40 U. MAmI L. REV. 5, 6-10 (1985). As of October, 1985, twenty-five states had
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Most of these laws protect child witnesses from the trauma inherent
in both the harsh courtroom atmosphere and the prospect of facing
the offender again." The laws provide for videotaped and closed-circuit

testimony, procedures which help shield child witnesses and enable
them to testify more effectively. 2 Some states have also passed special
hearsay exceptions, allowing the admission of out-of-court statements
made by victims of child sexual abuse. 13 Although these reforms promote prosecutorial efficiency and protect child victims, they threaten
4
to erode the criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses.
Consequently, courts must examine these reforms in light of the confrontation guarantees of the sixth amendment. 5
In the landmark case of Mattox v. United States,'6 the Supreme
Court considered the purpose and scope of the confrontation clause.'1
In Mattox, a federal trial court allowed the prosecution to read into
evidence transcripts of testimony from a prior trial. 8 The testimony
was that of two prosecution witnesses who died following the first
trial. 19 The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, deciding that this procedure sufficiently preserved the confrontation clause
guaranteesY. The Court stated that the main purpose of the clause

legislation providing for the use of videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing or deposition,
and sixteen states allowed children to testify at trial through closed-circuit television. Id. In
addition, eighteen states had adopted special hearsay exceptions for child witnesses. Id.
11. See id. See also Whitcomb, Child Victims in Court: The Limits of Innovation, 70
JUDICATURE, Aug.-Sept., 1986, at 90 (describing a variety of existing and proposed courtroom
innovations that might help protect child witnesses).
12. See Bulkley, supra note 10, at 7; O'Brien, supra note 9, at 148-51.
13. See Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation:Emerging Issues
in ChildSexual Abuse Prosecutions,40 U. MIAmI L. REV. 19, 29-32 (1985); Note, The Testimony
of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions:Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv.L. REV.
806, 811-13 (1985).
14. See Mlyniec & Daly, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims be
Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's ConstitutionalRights?, 40 U. MiAmi L.
REV. 115 (1985); O'Brien, supra note 9; Note, supra note 13.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... "
The confrontation clause was incorporated to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
16. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Justice Brown wrote the majority opinion.
17. Id. at 242-44.
18. Id. at 240. Defendant was initially convicted of murder, and, following an appeal, the
case was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 238.
19. Id. at 240.
20. Id. The Court stated: 'The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the public
shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused." Id. at 243.
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was to prevent the use of ex parte affidavits or depositions against a
criminal defendant. 2 According to the Court, the presence of witnesses
permits the defendant to cross-examine them and allows the jury to
observe their demeanor.2
The Court specifically noted that the Mattox defendant had a
chance to see the witnesses at the first trial,2 which implied that the
constitutional guarantee contemplated a face-to-face encounter. The
Court, however, maintained that the right to confrontation was not
absolute.?4 Rather, it asserted that strict adherence to the language
of the provision must sometimes yield to "considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case.' '
The Supreme Court also considered the defendant's constitutional
right to confront witnesses in California v. Green.26 In Green, the
Court affirmed a conviction in which the trial court admitted into
evidence a witness's testimony from a preliminary hearing.2 This testimony conflicted with the witness's testimony at trial.m Relying on
Mattox, the Supreme Court stated that the literal right to confront
the witness at trial lay at the core of the confrontation clause.- The
Court, however, recognized that certain circumstances might require
courts to be flexible when applying this principle.2 In Green, admission
of the prior testimony satisfied the defendant's confrontation rights
because the witness who testified at the preliminary hearing 31 was
available for cross-examination at trial.32 According to the GreenCourt,
confrontation ensures that (1) the witness testified under oath, (2) the
defendant cross-examined the witness, and (3) the jury observed the

21.

Id. at 242.

22. Id. at 242-43.
23.
24.

Id. at 240.
Id. at 243. More recent cases supporting the notion that the confrontation clause is not

absolute include Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62-65 (1980), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973).

25. 156 U.S. at 243. The Court asserted that protecting the safety of the public by admitting
such testimony warranted an exception to the defendant's right to confront the witness at trial.
Id.
26.
27.

399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
Id. at 152. The use of the prior testimony was necessary because the witness was

uncooperative and evasive at trial. Id. at 151.
28. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 157-58.
30. Id. at 160-62.
31. Id. at 159-60.
32. Id. at 162. The Court rejects the notion that only cross-examination contemporaneous
with the testimony can satisfy the confrontation guarantee. Id. at 159.
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In rejecting defendant's con-

stitutional challenge, the Court emphasized that these confrontation
values were adequately preserved under the circumstances of the
caseA4
While it described and justified the basic confrontation right, Green
offers trial courts little guidance regarding the specific kind of physical
encounter that the confrontation clause guarantees. However, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the sufficiency
of an indirect encounter between witness and defendant. In United
States v. Benfield,s a kidnapping victim testified by videotaped deposition to avoid the trauma of facing the defendant in court.3 The defendant's lawyer attended the deposition and cross-examined the witness. 3 7 The defendant watched the deposition on a monitor, and could

electronically signal the lawyer for consultation.w The witness could
not see the defendant, and was probably unaware of his presence in
the building. 39 The court held that the arrangement did not adequately
protect the defendant's confrontation rights. 40 According to the court,

33. Id. at 158. Professor Wigmore offers the following explanation of the confrontation
right: "Now confrontation is, in its main aspect, merely another term for the test of cross-examination. It is the preliminary step to securing the opportunity of cross-examination; and, so far
as it is essential, this is only because cross-examination is essential." 5 J. WIGMORE EVIDENCE
§ 1365, at 28 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974).
Wigmore further explains:
There is, however, a secondary advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the witness; the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain
subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness .... This secondary advantage, however, does not arise from the confrontation of the opponent and the
witness; it is not the consequence of those two being brought face to face. It is
the witness' presence before the tribunalthat secures this secondary advantage.
Id. § 1395 at 153-54.
34. Green, 399 U.S. at 157-58.
35. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
36. Id. at 817. The kidnapping victim in Benfield was an adult. Id. However, her psychiatrist
testified that because of her abduction-related psychiatric problem, she should not testify unless
the court could arrange for a less stressful environment. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The defendant was given a buzzer device with which he could halt the proceedings
and confer with his lawyer outside the deposition room. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 821. The Court was particularly concerned that excluding the defendant from
the deposition room would deny him the opportunity to actively participate in his defense. Id.
For a more extensive consideration of the use of televised testimony, see Hochheiser v. Superior
Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (use of two-way,
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"[m]ost believe that in some undefined but real way recollection, ver41
acity, and communication are influenced by face-to-face challenge.'
The court maintained that the language of the confrontation clause
unambiguously required both a face-to-face meeting and the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Benfield court, however, attempted to limit the impact of its decision. 43 Without setting specific
guidelines, the court asserted that innovations of this sort might be
acceptable if they more closely resemble a traditional courtroom setting."I
The New Jersey Superior Court permitted such an innovation in
State v. Sheppard.4 The court allowed a child victim of sexual abuse
6
to testify at trial from a nearby room using one-way video equipment.4
Both attorneys were in the room with the child. 47 The defendant,
judge, and jury watched the testimony on courtroom monitors. The
child witness could not see the defendant. 49 The court concluded that
the arrangement did not unduly restrict the defendant's confrontation
rights,50 nor did it significantly interfere with the flow of information
to the jury 1 The court contended that the arrangement deprived the
defendant of nothing except eye contact, which the confrontation clause
excuses.52 Citing Mattox, the Sheppard court suggested that considerations of public policy and necessity sometimes outweigh an incidental

closed-circuit television violated defendant's confrontation rights). But see Kansas City v. McCoy,
525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975) (approved the use of expert testimony via closed-circuit television
despite confrontation clause challenge).
41. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
42. Id. See also Herbert v. Superior Court of Cal., 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr.
850 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (rearrangement of courtroom so that defendant and witness could
not see one another violated defendant's confrontation rights).
43. 593 F.2d at 821. The court specifically stated that its decision did not preclude all uses
of videotaped or televised testimony. Id.
44. Id.
45. 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
46. Id. at 415, 484 A.2d at 1332.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 432, 484 A.2d at 1343.
50. Id. at 433, 484 A.2d at 1343.
51. Id. at 430, 484 A.2d at 1341. According to the court, videotaped presentations can
'"present clear, accurate, and evidentially appropriate transmissions of images and sounds to
defendant, the judge, the jury, and the public." Id. at 431, 484 A.2d at 1342. But see Comment,
The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR. L. REV. 567 (1976)
(discussion of how video techniques can alter the viewer's perception of the witness).
52. 197 N.J. Super. at 431, 484 A.2d at 1343. The court asserts that no case establishes
eye contact as a confrontation requirement.
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encroachment on the confrontation guarantee.0 The court concluded
that the state's interests in protecting child witnesses and efficiently
prosecuting child sexual abuse cases justified the use of video testimony.5
In the instant case, the Supreme Court refused to balance a right
it considered explicit in the sixth amendment.5 Instead, the Court
examined the literal meaning of the word "confront" to determine the
kind of encounter to which the criminal defendant was entitled. 6 The
Court explored the Latin origins of the word, 5 7 Shakespeare's writings,58 and Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Green 9 to establish
the meaning of "confront." 6° According to the Court, the confrontation
clause guaranteed a flesh-and-blood meeting between the witness and
accused.61 Consequently, the screen used to block the witness's view
2
of the defendant violated this right to direct confrontation.6
The Court justified its literal reading of the clause in a similarly
informal fashion. Referring to age-old expressions,6 human nature,6
and the remarks of an ex-President,r it demonstrated the value of a
face-to-face meeting with one's accusers. The Court stated that this
confrontation "serve[d] ends related both to appearance and to reality,' ' 6 suggesting that it promoted honest and reliable testimony as

53. Id. at 426, 484 A.2d at 1339. The Sheppard opinion provides an extensive consideration
of the need to protect child sexual abuse victims. Id. at 431-32, 484 A.2d at 1342.
54. Id. at 432-35, 484 A.2d at 1342-44. In addition, the court asserts that the use of video
technology often improves the quality and reliability of the child's testimony. Id. at 434-35, 484
A.2d at 1343-44.
55. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2800-03 (1988).
56. Id. at 2800-01.
57. Id. at 2800. The Court determined that 'the word 'confront' ultimately derives from
the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or 'opposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)." Id.
58. Id. The Court refers to a line from Shakespeare's Richard II in which Richard calls
for a face-to-face meeting between an accuser and the accused. Id.
59. Id. The Court cites to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 175 (1970) in which he asserted that a simple reading of the sixth amendment supports
the right to a face-to-face meeting between defendant and witness. 108 S. Ct. at 2800-01.
60. Id. at 2800.
61. Id. at 2800-01. But cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (suggesting that the
confrontation clause establishes only a "preference" for face-to-face confrontation).
62. 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
63. Id. at 2801-02. The Court offers the following- "Look me in the eye and say that." Id.
at 2801. "It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person to his face' than 'behind his
back.'" Id. at 2802.
64. Id. at 2801.
65. Id. The Court refers to remarks made by President Eisenhower concerning the tradition
in his hometown that accusations be made face-to-face. Id.
66. Id. at 2801.
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well as the perception of fairness to the defendant. 7 Prior decisions,
the Court explained, reflected this common-sense interpretation of the
clause.68 These decisions acknowledged the defendant's literal right to
69
face the witness at trial.
The instant case further established that the Court would not
lightly disregard this face-to-face confrontation right. 70 The state argued that this right must yield to the need to protect victims of child
sexual abuse; the Court responded by adhering to its literal interpretation of the confrontation clause.71 Because the right to a face-to-face
encounter was explicit in the sixth amendment, it was less susceptible
to compromise or exception than were other confrontation guarantees. T2 Courts need not strictly protect such safeguards as the right
to cross-examine, which was only implied in the confrontation clause.'
While the Court contemplated possible exceptions to the face-to-face
encounter guarantee, it indicated that they would be rare. 74 Further-

more, the trial court in the instant case made no specific finding that
the witnesses needed protection. 75 The Court asserted that a general

need to protect witnesses, like that underlying the statute, was insufficient to vitiate the confrontation clause.76

67. Id. at 2801-02. The Court also refers to Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (language
suggests that confrontation serves symbolic goals related to society's perception of fairness).
68. 108 S. Ct. at 2801. The Court relies on the following cases that contain language
suggesting a right to a face-to-face confrontation: Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)
(asserting that confrontation clause provides both the right to conduct cross-examination and
the right to physically face the witness at trial); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970)
(asserting that a literal right to a face-to-face meeting is at the core of confrontation clause
guarantees); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (interpreting a provision of the
Philippine Bill of Rights as substantially the same as the confrontation clause and including a
guarantee of a face-to-face encounter at trial).
69. 108 S. Ct. at 2801.
70. Id. at 2803.
71. Id. at 2802-03.
72. Id.
73. Id. In addition to cross-examination, the Court identifies the right to exclude out-of-court
statements and the right to face-to-face confrontation during proceedings other than the actual
trial, as examples of less protected safeguards that are more susceptible to exception. Id.
74. Id. at 2803.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court relies on the reasoning in Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775,
2782-83 (1987), that in the absence of an exception 'Trmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence,"
more than a generalized finding of necessity is required. Id. But see Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809
n.6 (Blacknun, J., dissenting) (asserting that general legislative exceptions to confrontation
clause guarantees are commonplace). See generally Goldman, Not So "FirmlyRooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1987) (criticizing the use of the 'Tfily
rooted" concept).
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By explicitly relying on the literal sixth amendment right to face-to-

face confrontation,7 the instant Court avoided the balancing approach
9 In Mattox and Green, the Court weighed
of Mattox7s and Green.7
the

accused's confrontation rights against competing interests of policy
and need ° In those cases, the Court initially identified the underlying
purposes of the confrontation clause8 1 It then determined whether
the questioned procedure impaired those objectives.s, If the procedure
essentially preserved the confrontation rights, the Court considered
whether it served a purpose that justifiably infringed on absolute
confrontation values.8 This approach enabled the Court to maintain
the integrity of the confrontation clause,8 while allowing it some flexibility to decide individual cases.
Had the instant court undertaken a balancing approach, it would
have weighed the defendant's narrow confrontation interest - eye
contact with the witness - against the state's interests in protecting
child sexual abuse victims and effectively prosecuting the offenders.
The Iowa trial court, like those in Benfield and Sheppard, shielded
the witness in a way that minimally restricted the defendant's confrontation with the witnesses. The defendant argued that the use of the
screen violated his right to be in view of the witnesses while they
testified. In all other respects, the defendant fully confronted the

77. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
80. The policy considerations in Mattox and Green involved the need to admit testimony
from witnesses who had testified on the matter but were now unavailable. See Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 238 (1895) (witnesses no longer alive); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
152 (1970) (uncooperative witness). Recently the Court used a similar balancing approach in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). In Ritchie, the Court considered whether a defendant
charged with child sexual abuse was entitled to examine the child's confidential social services
file. Id. at 51. The Court weighed the public interest in protecting sensitive information of this
type against the burden on the defendant of preparing his defense without the information. Id.
at 60-61. The Court concluded that the defendant could effectively cross-examine the child
without the information in the file, and therefore, his confrontation rights were satisfied. Id.
at 53-54.
81. See supra notes 21-23 & 29-34 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 20-23 & 31-34 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 24-25 & 28-30 and accompanying text.
84. For recent discussions of the Court's interpretation of the confrontation clause, see
Graham, The ConfrontationClause, the HearsayRule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:
The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988); Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557 (1988); Massaro, The Dignity
Value in Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988).
85. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2799 (1988).
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witnesses.1 Furthermore, none of the confrontation purposes identified in Greenk' were sacrificed by the use of the screen. The children
testified under oath, in front of the jury, and were cross-examined by
the defendant8
The instant Court, however, ignored how minimally the screen
restricted actual confrontation between the defendant and witness.
Focusing on the literal meaning of the clause,9 the Court concluded
that the procedure blatantly violated confrontation guaranteesY° The
Court discounted the value of mutual eye contact between witness
and defendant as a means to ensure reliable testimony. While the
Court intimated that face-to-face confrontation encouraged more conscientious testimony, 91 it failed to evaluate the potential truth-finding
value in the jury's observation of the witness's response to seeing the
defendant. Instead, the Court referred to literature, anecdote, and
human nature,9 suggesting that fairness to the defendant compels a
face-to-face encounter.93 The Court, however, briefly mentioned this
"fairness" value;9 it relied primarily on its literal reading of the confrontation clause.9
Rather than closely examining confrontation values, the instant
Court simply interpreted the word "confront" to mean a physical faceto-face encounter.9 It assigned the flesh and blood encounter guarantee a preferred status among confrontation rights.Y Other safeguards,
such as the hearsay exclusion of out-of-court statements, did not enjoy
a protected status.98 Therefore, they had been excepted by the Court.9
Yet, admitting out-of-court statements often necessarily denies face-toface confrontation. 1°° Similarly, most hearsay exceptions prevent confrontation.' 0 Furthermore, the Court's position offers no guarantee
86. See id. at 2799-2800.
87. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
88. 108 S. Ct. at 2799-2800.
89. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
90. 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
91. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 58 & 63-65 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
94. See Massaro, supra note 84, at 894-97.
95. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
96. 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
97. See id. at 2802-03.
98. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. See 108 S. Ct. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (asserting that if the confrontation clause
is given an unqualified scope, virtually all hearsay exceptions would be abrogated); Graham,
supra note 84, at 539.
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that the witness and accused will exchange eye contact. Nothing compels a witness to look at the defendant, even in the absence of a
shield. 10 2 If the guarantee of eye contact is so fundamental to confrontation, perhaps the Court should ensure that it occurs.' °3
The instant opinion ignored the state's interests in protecting child
witnesses and facilitating child sexual abuse prosecutions. Often, only
the child victim witnesses the incident, which makes the child's testimony crucial to the prosecution's case.0 4 The child's testimony is frequently either ineffective or unavailable because the trial process inhibits and intimidates the child witness, especially when the witness
encounters the offender in court.' °0 The instant court simply acknowledged that such trauma may occur.' ° To insist that a specific protective
need be found before the Court will consider an exception to the
face-to-face confrontation right' ° suggests that the Court was unwilling
to view these dangers as important policy concerns. 1°8 According to
the Court, the risks of witness trauma and prosecutorial inefficiency
are the price of constitutional guarantees.1°9
Courts should not trample the rights of the accused in their haste
to curb child sexual abuse. However, the instant Court's literal interpretation of the confrontation clause sacrifices a thorough consideration of the countervailing interests. By abandoning the analysis used
in prior cases, the instant decision casts doubt over many legal reforms
taking place across the country." 0 Most of these reforms provide procedures, such as televised testimony, that compromise face-to-face
confrontation to a greater degree than the one-way screen.,,, The

102. The Court acknowledges that the confrontation clause does not guarantee eye contact.
108 S. Ct. at 2802. However, the Court points out that the trier of fact can observe whether
the witness chooses to look at the defendant and, from that observation, draw its own conclusions.
Id.
103. Justice Blackmun's dissent points out this apparent inconsistency by suggesting that
a blind witness could never satisfactorily be confronted at trial. Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
104. O'Brien, supra note 9, at 142; see also Note, supra note 13, at 806-07.
105. See O'Brien, supra note 9, at 142-43; Note, supra note 13, at 806-07, 807 n.15.
106. 108 S. Ct. at 2802. For a thorough consideration of the problem of trauma in child
sex abuse prosecutions, see Marks, Victimizing the Child Victim: Vermont Rule of Evidence
807 and Trauma in the Courtroom, 11 VT. L. REv. 631 (1986).
107. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
108. The Court explains that exceptions to the face-to-face right exist only to protect
important public policy concerns. Id. Finding no exception in the instant case, the Court appears
to reject the need to protect child witnesses as an overriding public policy. See id.
109. Id. at 2802.
110. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
111.

Id.
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instant case creates an absolute right for the defendant to confront
an available, testifying witness in person and without obstruction.'1
Thus, any attempt to shield a child from the defendant at trial will
likely fall to a constitutional challenge.
Jeffrey Meyers

112. Even in concurrence, Justice O'Connor recognizes the potentially great impact of the
instant case on child-shielding procedures and rejects the idea that the confrontation right is
absolute. 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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